TABNAK- Tariq Raouf, former Head of Nuclear Verification and Security Policy Coordination at IAEA says since late 2023, the Iran file in the US State department has had no leadership.
“The Gaza/West Bank and broader regional situation cannot be fully divorced from the overall Iran nuclear file,” Rauf told TABNAK
Following is the text of the TABNAK interview with Tariq Raouf about the Agency's upcoming report on Iran
“The IAEA Board meets 9-13 September and the General Conference from 16-20 September.
In the IAEA report of 29 August, the Agency confirms that it has carried out verification and monitoring under the JCPOA at Fordow on 26 August, at Natanz on 24 August, and at Natanz PFEP on 21 August. And, at centrifuge research and development on 21 August 2024, and uranium stocks and fuels on 16 August 2024. The report also includes a summary of Iran's enrichment capacity and lists the number of operating cascades including for the first time the numbers of centrifuges in each operating cascade. The report states that based on Iran's inventory change reports, the Agency has estimated the total enriched uranium stocks including 164.7 kg at 60% (an increase of 22.6 kg from May), and 813.9 kg of 20% (an increase of 62.6 kg from May 2024).
Now the confusing matter created by the Agency is that Iran has committed to fully implementing its NPT safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/214) and thus is obligated to place all "nuclear" activities and nuclear material under Agency safeguards, including every milligram of enriched uranium. In the Iran safeguards report, the Agency makes no mention that it cannot verify Iran's declared nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As Iran is not fully implementing the JCPOA, in response to the US withdrawal, but Iran is continuing to provide reports and access on its declared "nuclear" facilities and nuclear materials > however, Iran has withdrawn access to facilities of centrifuge manufacturing and assembly which are not categorized as "nuclear" facilities under INFCIRC/214 safeguards agreement.
It is somewhat confusing and irregular for the Agency to state in the JCPOA report (para. 34) that the "Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows..." The terminology of loss of continuity of knowledge is a specific term for safeguards implementation, and it is incorrect to use it in regard to the JCPOA. The Agency instead could say "the Agency no longer has accurate and up to data on the production and inventory ...."
Thus, the Agency needs to remove confusions and report accordingly. Safeguards matters in the safeguards report, and JCPOA in the JCPOA report and cross reference when it comes to verification/safeguards relating to declared "nuclear" facilities and nuclear materials; and distinguish JCPOA commitments that go beyond INFCIRC/214 mandate.
The situation is that confusion reigns both in the Agency, the Board, the media and commentators.
However, overriding political considerations complicate the situation and prevent the rationalization of the two reports.
The Agency states in the JCPOA report (para. 33) that the Director General sent a congratulatory message to President Pezeshkian and expressed readiness to travel to Iran and re-launch dialogue; and received a reply from the President confirming his agreement to meet with the DG at an appropriate juncture.
Since late 2023, the Iran file in the US State department has had no leadership, with the sidelining of Robert Malley and during this year the Biden administration has not focused on the Iran file, leaving the EU/E3 at a loss of direction. US policy on Iran will now only be clarified in February 2025 under a new US president, till then Iran and the EU/E3 and the Agency will have to manage the Iran file at the Board and not rock the boat. Iran to continue its cooperation on the JCPOA and to keep its 20%/60% enriched uranium stocks at not getting too large but continuously under IAEA verification and monitoring; and for the EU/E3 to refrain from unnecessary provocations or excitement. Finally, the Gaza/West Bank and broader regional situation cannot be fully divorced from the overall Iran nuclear file....”
