“Russia is opposed to the armed forces of any NATO country entering Ukraine but might be amenable to an entirely non-Western peacekeeping force,” Dr.Korybko told TABNAK News Agency.
Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD in Political Science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity and shares his insight in a personal capacity.
Following is the full text of the interview with him:
Q: The Ukraine peace talks were held in Riyadh with the participation of Russia and the United States. Both countries have assessed the talks as positive and successful. From Moscow's perspective, the main objectives of these talks include "the full restoration of Russia-U.S. relations," "preparation for potential talks about the Ukraine crisis," and "setting the stage for a meeting between Putin and Trump." Do you think these talks will pave the way for these goals?
A: Putin and Trump proved their sincere intent to reach a deal for politically resolving their countries’ proxy war in Ukraine after choreographing the latest votes at the UN where they both vetoed an anti-Russian resolution and then later both voted in support of a neutral one. Neither wants to risk a potentially uncontrollable escalation like what could happen if the conflict worsens, while Russia also wants to make domestic reforms as soon as possible whereas the US wants to “Pivot (back) to Asia” to contain China.
Q: Trump has stated that he does not oppose the presence of European peacekeepers in Ukraine but that American forces will not be involved. How does Moscow view this move?
A: Russia is opposed to the armed forces of any NATO country entering Ukraine but might be amenable to an entirely non-Western peacekeeping force. There’s also the hypothetical possibility that its approach towards Western peacekeepers changes throughout the course of negotiations with the US but that appears unlikely. The reason is that it doesn’t want them to serve as human shields behind which Ukraine could provoke Russia while deterring it from responding out of fear of sparking World War III.
Q: Before the Riyadh talks began, the U.S. representative stated that part of the negotiations would focus on asking Russia to distance itself from Iran. However, Moscow had indicated that Iran was not a subject of the talks. Do you think a potential agreement between Moscow and Washington will affect the relationship between Tehran and Moscow?
A: Russia’s strategic relations with Iran are independent of its ties with any third country and therefore won’t change even if relations with the US improve. They have shared interests in the energy industry, the North-South Transport Corridor, and stability in the broader region. A potential agreement between Moscow and Washington might actually strengthen Russia’s strategic relations with Iran since it could place the Kremlin in a unique position to help mediate Iranian-US talks if requested by both to do so.
Q: During the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Iran, the Iranian nuclear issue was also discussed. Despite this, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that Lavrov did not carry a message from the United States and that Lavrov provided Iran with a complete report on the Russian-American negotiations in Riyadh. What is your assessment of Lavrov's trip and does he want Iran to talk to the United States under the current circumstances? Because Lavrov, in joint conference with Iranian counterpart, emphasized that the window of diplomacy is still open and Araghchi announced that we would not negotiate with the United States under pressure.
A: Lavrov’s trip was aimed at making tangible progress on the newly updated Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership with respect to the proposed trilateral gas pipeline with Azerbaijan and building a railway between it and Iran to streamline the North-South Transport Corridor. While there, his report on the Russian-US talks in Riyadh informed Iran of America’s new worldview under Trump 2.0, how it envisages attaining this, and his team’s negotiating strategy. This can help Iran if it resumes talks with the US.
Q: There is an argument that, as a result of the nature of the new world order (a system based on great power competition), the U.S. seeks to separate Russia from China or, at the very least, put Russia in a position where it no longer poses a threat to the U.S. What is your assessment of this?
A: Russia won’t turn against China like China turned against the USSR, but it’s possible that the US and its allies (particularly the Indo-Pacific Rim countries of India, Japan, and South Korea) offer Russia better energy and mineral deals than China does in order to deprive it of more of those resources. Russia won’t curtail exports to China, but the current level might become the ceiling if the others buy everything for higher prices, which could offset China’s growth trajectory that it requires for becoming a superpower.
Q: Given the Trump administration's preference for Russia instead of Europe, what actions do you think Europe will take in response to what it considers Russian threats? Can they achieve deterrence against Russia without the U.S.?
A: Trump doesn’t prefer Russia over Europe per se, it’s just that Europe wants to prolong the proxy war while both the US and Russia now want to end it, hence the emerging transatlantic rift. The US won’t abandon Europe though since it’ll still keep some troops there and adhere to NATO’s Article 5, but it’ll probably redeploy some troops and equipment to Asia to more muscularly contain China. The EU will therefore likely undertake a major militarization program to replace some of these lost capabilities.
