TEHRAN (Tabnak) – Professor Paul Pillar, who was CIA intelligence analyst for 28 years, says successful resolution of the issues between Iran and IAEA to which Grossi was referring would help to create a favorable climate for negotiations between Iran and the United States on other nuclear matters.
“The U.S. government subsequently indicated that it had arranged with Qatar to block any further movement of the funds, as a response to Iran's support of Hamas,” Pillar told Tabnak News Agency.
Following is the full text of the interview.
Tabnak: The nuclear status of Iran and America is based on the understanding of May 2023. However, Iran has not been able to get its blocked funds. Can this understanding continue?
A: Among the several provisions of the understanding reached in 2023 was the unblocking of some funds, principally held by banks in South Korea, that represented payment for previous shipments of oil from Iran. The funds were to be moved to banks in Qatar and used only for food, medicine, or other humanitarian purposes. Little, if any, of the funds had been spent by the time of the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. The U.S. government subsequently indicated that it had arranged with Qatar to block any further movement of the funds, as a response to Iran's support of Hamas. Given that the unblocking of the funds was a key provision of what was agreed to in 2023, it is difficult to see how the entire understanding can continue as long as this money remains frozen.
Tabnak: The US House of Representatives has approved a bill that limits Iran's oil sales to China. Will the Biden administration implement this bill? If this happens, the facilitation of Iran's oil sales to China, which is said to be part of the understanding of May 2023, will be violated. If the Biden government implements the bill, won't the main framework of this understanding be destroyed?
A: This bill does not actually limit directly any Iranian oil sales to China. What the legislation would do is to require the administration to identify any Chinese banks that were involved in oil transactions with Iran and to extend U.S. sanctions to those banks. If the legislation were to become law, there are several possibilities of what might happen next. The administration probably would view its actions at least as much in terms of shaping its policy toward China as it would in thinking about policy toward Iran. It might claim it had insufficient information to identify all the financial institutions involved in any Iranian oil transactions. Or, even if it did identify and sanction some Chinese banks, unless those banks had substantial business with the U.S. financial system--exclusion from which is what sanctions would involve--the banks might continue to be involved in Iranian oil sales to China, without feeling any harm from the sanctions. In short, this legislation is mainly a gesture to express congressional views about China and about Iran. I do not believe it will play a critical role in the viability of any understandings between Iran and the United States.
Tabnak: According to some news, Iran and the United States are conducting indirect negotiations, one of the axes of which is the nuclear issue. Why do you think these talks were formed after the direct conflict between Iran and Israel?
A: There always are likely to be multiple factors behind the timing of negotiations. But it may well be that the exchange of aerial attacks between Israel and Iran, by reminding everyone of the danger of escalation in the region, may have provided an additional motivation to use diplomacy to try to reduce tensions involving the United States and Iran.
Tabnak: It seems that the May understanding could not meet Iran's expectations. Is it possible for the Biden government to reach a new agreement with Iran in the second round? In this regard, people like Ben Rhodes served as deputy national security advisor to President Barack Obama, believe that the Biden government should reach an agreement with Iran in the second term. What is your assessment?
A: I certainly believe that Biden in a second term should try to reach a new agreement concerning the Iranian nuclear program. Whether he will—if he is re-elected—actually makes such an attempt is difficult to say. Although in a second term the president will no longer need to worry about re-election, Biden still would have to deal with much hostility toward Iran in the U.S. Congress, and how that hostility translates into opposition to any sort of agreement with Iran, even one that serves to limit Iran’s nuclear program. This factor will be especially a concern as long as the war in the Gaza Strip continues, given the widespread sympathy for Israel and the perception of Iran backing Hamas.
Tabnak: In his recent conversation with the Financial Times, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi announced that Iran is ready to hold ‘serious talks’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Can this process lead to the start of nuclear talks?
A: The IAEA's concerns involve access for IAEA inspectors, re-installation of some of the agency's cameras, and still-unresolved questions about possible military applications of the Iranian nuclear program in the past. These IAEA topics are different from most of the issues involved in the JCPOA, which would also have to be addressed in any replacement to the JCPOA that Iran and the United States might negotiate (even though IAEA inspections no doubt would play a role in any new agreement). However, successful resolution of the issues between Iran and IAEA to which Grossi was referring would help to create a favorable climate for negotiations between Iran and the United States on other nuclear matters.
