TABNAK –Nader Entessar, Professor Emeritus of Political Science from university of South Alabama says that the new order in the South Caucasus is a fluid one and is currently being shaped and reshaped.
“Russia's role in the emerging South Caucasus order is diminishing and will continue to diminish as countries like the US, France, and Turkey are adopting a more robust strategy in the region,” Entessar told TABNAK News Agency.
Following is the full text of interview with Professor Entessar:
Q: Russian President Putin visited Azerbaijan. This trip happened while the war with Ukraine has been extended into the territory of Russia. What were the reasons for this trip at this point in time?
A: I believe Putin's trip to the Republic of Azerbaijan has more to do with Russia's declining influence in the strategic vortex of the South Caucasus than developments on the Ukraine war front. Last month Armenia announced plans to withdraw from the Russian-dominated Collective Security Organization, thus signaling Armenia's long-term plan to pivot away from Russian orbit. About three weeks ago, Russian border guards withdrew from Yerevan's international airport where they had been stationed since 1991, the year Armenia gained its independence. With the loss of influence in Armenia, Putin wants to ensure that Russia's influence in Azerbaijan is not completely eroded.
Q: Putin has expressed his desire to help the peace agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia during this trip. Does Russia still want to play the main role in the negotiation process?
A: Russia still desires to play an important role in securing a possible peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, with the erosion of Moscow's influence in Armenia, it will be a tall order for Russia to act as a main player in this possible agreement. Of course, Russia's proximity to the South Caucasus and its historical place as an important arbiter of political disputes in the region may give Moscow some leverage, but Russia can no longer play the dominating role it has played in the South Caucasus in the recent past.
Q: What message does this trip have for Armenia? After the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia has taken an anti-Russian approach and has approached America and France.
A: Russia may want to try to reassert its previous role in the South Caucasus. However, as you mentioned, Moscow's hesitant, or pro-Azerbaijan role in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a turning point in Armenian-Russian relations and Armenia's desire to look to the West Yerevan's strategic outlook is shifting toward alignment with the US, France and possible other NATO countries.
Q: It has been said that one of the goals of this trip may be related to Iran. The tension between Iran and Israel, the cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv, and the possibility of Iran attacking Israel's positions in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan are alleged cases. What is your assessment?
A: There may be a grain of truth to this argument, but I think it is largely speculative and without a strong foundation. At this time, we don't know what course of action Iran will take in response to Israel's assassination of Esmail Hanniyeh in Tehran, or if Iran would jeopardize its relations with Baku by carrying out military actions inside Azerbaijan, even against Israel's positions there. Whatever actions Iran will take would entail costs. I am sure Iranian authorities will do a cost-benefit analysis when, or if, Tehran decides to carry military attacks inside a neighboring country.
Q: What is your assessment of the new order in the South Caucasus and is closer cooperation between Moscow and Baku detrimental to Iran?
A: The new order in the South Caucasus is a fluid one and is currently being shaped and reshaped. However, as I stated earlier, Russia's role in the emerging South Caucasus order is diminishing and will continue to diminish as countries like the US, France, and Turkey are adopting a more robust strategy in the region. With Baku's Western orientation and its close ties to Turkey, there are limits to Moscow-Baku cooperation. What is more detrimental to Iran's geostrategic interests in the South Caucasus is the creeping Western (and Turkish) presence in the region.
