TABNAK– Professor Paul Pillar, who was CIA intelligence analyst for 28 years, says Iranian decision-makers probably have not reached a decision yet on this, both because it is difficult to identify attractive options and because they are waiting to see results of Gaza negotiations.
“The missile barrage in April was an example of something Iran can do that is big and dramatic but was calibrated in a way to avoid significant further escalation by Israel,” Pillar told Tabnak News Agency.
Following is the full text of the interview.
Q: The Gaza ceasefire negotiations ended in Doha, Qatar, while the three countries, the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, declared it constructive, and it was decided to continue reviewing the details at next week's meeting in Cairo. What is your assessment of these negotiations?
A: Certainly the mediators are putting much effort and priority into the effort. Although an agreement might not be as near as the Biden administration suggests, I think there is somewhat more of a chance of reaching some kind of deal than there was a month or two ago. The current main areas of disagreement include things such as the size of the Israeli military presence along the Egyptian border, check points for Palestinians returning to homes in northern Gaza, and lists of Palestinian prisoners to be released. It is possible at least in principle to bridge gaps on these issues.
Q: Hamas has announced that the Doha negotiations were a waste of time and has demanded the implementation of the previous negotiations. Hamas believes that Netanyahu is trying to buy time by proposing new negotiations. Will the implementation of the three-phase plan of the US for the Gaza ceasefire be realized?
A: Netanyahu clearly has been seeking to delay any agreement, because of his well-known reasons for continuing a war. One likely scenario is that some sort of deal is reached similar to the US three-phase idea, but it never gets beyond the first phase because Israel then declares that negotiations on a total cease-fire have bogged down and resumes military operations.
Q: The realization of the ceasefire will end Netanyahu's political life. Knowing this, Netanyahu does not want a ceasefire. Will America be able to put pressure on Netanyahu's government in this regard?
A: The question about US pressure on the Israeli government has always been not about capability but instead about political willingness. I do not foresee any significant change in US policy in this regard. If Harris is elected, she might be slightly less deferential to Israel than Biden has been, but in any case, a new US administration is still five months away.
Q: It seems that Iran and Hezbollah are considering the results of the Gaza ceasefire negotiations for a military response to Israel. Although Iran has declared that the ceasefire in Gaza is a priority, it has called Iran's reaction independent of it. What is your assessment?
A: Well, Iran's reaction regarding responding to the Haniyeh assassination is not really independent of the Gaza ceasefire issue. And it makes sense for Iran to establish some sort of linkage between the two issues, because a Gaza ceasefire is important in its own right, because the issue is one on which Iran demonstrates its support for the Palestinians, and because with a ceasefire Iran can say it helped to get Israel to back down on something important--perhaps relieving Iran of the need to do something more forceful in response to the assassination.
Q: Do you think Iran will attack Israel directly to show its deterrence power and prevent Israel to impose new redline?
A: Iranian decision-makers probably have not reached a decision yet on this, both because it is difficult to identify attractive options and because they are waiting to see results of Gaza negotiations. The missile barrage in April was an example of something Iran can do that is big and dramatic but was calibrated in a way to avoid significant further escalation by Israel. I don't think, however, that Iranian leaders want to merely repeat that kind of response. Another possibility is to avoid that kind of direct attack on Israel and instead respond with something like a clandestine attempt to assassinate an Israeli official overseas--which would be more nearly a tit-for-tat in response to the killing of Haniyeh. But it also is possible--per my response to #4--that if a Gaza ceasefire agreement is reached, Iran will claim partial credit for that and say that getting Israel to back down on a ceasefire is itself enough of a response for the killing of a senior Palestinian official.
