TEHRAN-TABNAK, Jan 25–Marc Finaud, Associate Fellow at the GCSP at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), says the IAEA has a different mandate and separate agreements with Iran to ensure compliance with the Safeguards Agreement.
He adds that “However, there was always some interdependence between implementation of the Safeguards Agreement (and the Additional Protocol despite its non-ratification by Iran) and the JCPOA.”
“Trump administration is ready to negotiate on the whole issue, separately or in the framework of a new JCPOA,” Finaud told Tabnak News Agency.
Following is the full text of interview:
Q: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, has considered negotiations between Iran and the United States essential to resolve the nuclear issue. What is your assessment of his words?
A: This is very realistic and pragmatic. It is true that the JCPOA was concluded only after key issues were negotiated directly between Iran and the United States. It is probably even more true now after Trump's return to the White House and Biden's failure to restore the JCPOA.
Q: In general, why has Grossi entered such an issue? Is this issue defined as one of his duties?
A: Of course, the IAEA has a different mandate and separate agreements with Iran to ensure compliance with the Safeguards Agreement. However, there was always some interdependence between implementation of the Safeguards Agreement (and the Additional Protocol despite its non-ratification by Iran) and the JCPOA. The purpose is the same: to ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains only peaceful, and the IAEA is needed to certify whether Iran is complying or not with the JCPOA.
Q: António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, said at the Davos summit, “Iran must make it clear once and for all that it will stop having nuclear weapons.” These statements come at a time when Grossi said at the same summit that we have no evidence of nuclear weapons production in Iran. In fact, Guterres is accusing Iran while Grossi, as the Director General of the institution responsible for verification in this regard, denies it. What is the reason for Guterres' words?
A: Perhaps the confusion comes from a translation issue. Guterres does know that Iran doesn't presently have nuclear weapons. He just wants to make sure this remains the case.
Q: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has supported the ‘Snapback’ mechanism. We are about 8 months away from October 2025, when the restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA will end. If the US is seeking an agreement with Iran, why is it raising such a statement? Is it being raised as a leverage of pressure?
A: Indeed, this is part of Trump's "maximum pressure" strategy to influence Iran's policy. However, it could also be a good sign that the Trump administration is ready to negotiate on the whole issue, separately or in the framework of a new JCPOA.
Q: If Iran and the US reach an agreement, what will be the reaction of Europe? Some believe that if the E3’s concerns are not met in the Iran-US agreement, they may use the ‘Snapback’ mechanism as a lever to disrupt the Iran-US agreement. Do you agree with this argument?
A: This is hypothetical. We can assume that there will be some coordination between the E3 and the US, even if the methods to reach an agreement may vary (a sort of division of labor between the "good cop" and the "bad cop"). In any case, a snapback of sanctions by the European without the Americans would not have much weight and could be counter-productive, hurting European economic interests more.
