TEHRAN (Tabnak) – Professor Paul Pillar, who was CIA intelligence analyst for 28 years, says although the JCPOA and other agreements or understandings between Iran and other powers are not part of the immediate issues between Iran and the IAEA, the IAEA can hardly afford to ignore these other agreements.
“They do not constitute the IAEA making judgments about which obligations under the agreements are still valid and which are not,” Pillar told Tabnak News Agency.
He adds: The resolution does not have legal consequences. If the issues involved were to be referred to the United Nations Security Council, then the Council could take legally binding action, but there is no indication yet of that happening.
Following is the full text of the interview.
Q: At the same time, the resolution against Iran was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which previously announced that the United States is against EU3 action. It seemed that America would prevent EU3 from taking action. However, after the approval of the resolution, America announced coordination with EU3 in this field. What was the reason for this change in America's position?
A: The U.S. position has not really changed. The United States has believed all along that a censure resolution at this time was not going to solve problems, and it was not looking for a new confrontation with Iran. But given that the EU3 were determined to press ahead with a resolution, it made sense for the U.S. to work with the Europeans so that the U.S. could have some influence on exactly what the resolution would say. And according to press reports, the final resolution was milder than it otherwise would have been, thanks to the U.S. role in shaping it. The United States is not looking for a confrontation with the Europeans any more than it wants a confrontation with Iran.
Q: Iran has called the approval of this resolution non-constructive. In your opinion, what negative effects will this resolution have on the cooperation between Iran and the IAEA?
A: Past experience suggests that this kind of censure does not motivate Iran to cooperate more with the IAEA and could have the opposite effect. In this case, it might mean something like Iran increasing its supply of 60% enriched uranium. It is this kind of counterproductive effect that was the reason the United States did not favor a censure resolution in the first place.
Q: Regarding Iran's safeguard obligations, the IAEA also referred to the March 2023 understanding in its report. While this understanding is outside Iran's safeguard obligations. It seems that the IAEA has interpreted the obligations beyond safeguards and based on the JCPOA as Iran's safeguard obligations, while the other party has not adhered to the JCPOA. What is your assessment?
A: Although the JCPOA and other agreements or understandings between Iran and other powers are not part of the immediate issues between Iran and the IAEA, the IAEA can hardly afford to ignore these other agreements. After all, it was the IAEA that was charged with doing the inspections that were specified in the JCPOA. References to these other agreements in IAEA reports is to be expected as part of the overall picture of nuclear issues involving Iran. They do not constitute the IAEA making judgments about which obligations under the agreements are still valid and which are not.
Q: What will be the legal consequences of the approved resolution?
A: The resolution does not have legal consequences. If the issues involved were to be referred to the United Nations Security Council, then the Council could take legally binding action, but there is no indication yet of that happening.
