TABNAK –Marc Finaud, Associate Fellow at the GCSP at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), says the US was concerned that, as in previous cases, Iran would retaliate to such a resolution of the Board of Governors by increasing its nuclear program and moving towards the production of weapons-grade material.
He adds that “Apparently, in negotiations with the E3, the text of the resolution was watered down and makes no mention of a possible deferral of Iran to the Security Council for breach of its Safeguards Agreement.”
Following is the full text of interview:
Q: At the same time, the resolution against Iran was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which previously announced that the United States is against EU3 action. It seemed that America would prevent EU3 from taking action. However, after the approval of the resolution, America announced coordination with EU3 in this field. What was the reason for this change in America's position?
A: Initially, the US was concerned that, as in previous cases, Iran would retaliate to such a resolution of the Board of Governors by increasing its nuclear program and moving towards the production of weapons-grade material. Apparently, in negotiations with the E3, the text of the resolution was watered down and makes no mention of a possible deferral of Iran to the Security Council for breach of its Safeguards Agreement.
Q: Iran has called the approval of this resolution non-constructive. In your opinion, what negative effects will this resolution have on the cooperation between Iran and the IAEA?
A: If Iran rejects this new call for cooperation with the IAEA despite two previous resolutions to that end in 2020 and 2022 as well as the March 2023 joint declaration with the IAEA, it will raise even more suspicion that its nuclear program is no longer only peaceful. So, it would be in its own interest to agree to solve all the current difficulties with the IAEA, including the particle probes and full access of IAEA inspectors.
Q: Regarding Iran's safeguard obligations, the IAEA also referred to the March 2023 understanding in its report. While this understanding is outside Iran's safeguard obligations. It seems that the IAEA has interpreted the obligations beyond safeguards and based on the JCPOA as Iran's safeguard obligations, while the other party has not adhered to the JCPOA. What is your assessment?
A: Officially, Iran has not withdrawn from the JCPOA and is still bound by its provisions, although it has suspended some of the key provisions in response to the US withdrawal and reimposition of sanctions. One important aspect is transparency, among others on the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment in operation, and the need for the IAEA to be in a position to assess this number to determine the extent of Iran's nuclear program.
Q: What will be the legal consequences of the approved resolution?
A: Iran will under close scrutiny by the IAEA and its Member States to assess whether it is complying with its legal obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol (that Iran agreed to implement although it has not ratified it). It is assumed that, in case Iran is seen as not cooperating with the IAEA, the Board of Governors may decide to defer Iran to the UN Security Council. Of course, since Russia and China voted against the recent Board of Governors resolution, one could expect that those countries would veto any sanctions against Iran in the Security Council. But the whole process may be detrimental to Iran's image and interests.
