“Any improvement of relations between Washington and Moscow can only affect positively relations with Iran,” Finaud told Tabnak News Agency.
Following is the full text of interview:
Q: Before the Riyadh talks began, the U.S. representative stated that part of the negotiations would focus on asking Russia to distance itself from Iran. However, Moscow had indicated that Iran was not a subject of the talks. Do you think a potential agreement between Moscow and Washington will impact the relationship between Tehran and Moscow?
A: It is highly likely that the Iran file was discussed between American and Russian representatives. It can be assumed that Russia expressed support for Iran, its strategic ally, and discouraged any use of force against the Islamic Republic. Any improvement of relations between Washington and Moscow can only affect positively relations with Iran.
Q: After the Riyadh negotiations between Russia and the United States, we witnessed the visit and presence of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Iran. During the joint meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Lavrov emphasized that the door to diplomacy for Iran's nuclear negotiations is still open, while Araghchi stated that Iran does not negotiate under pressure with the United States. It appears that Moscow is keen on facilitating dialogue between Iran and the United States under the current conditions. What is your assessment?
A: It is logical and legitimate for Iran to reject the policy of "maximum pressure" officially adopted by the Trump administration while Iran reaffirmed its readiness for a negotiated diplomatic solution. What is new is the opportunity, resulting from the U.S.-Russian rapprochement, for a Russian mediation between Washington and Tehran.
Q: Bloomberg has reported that Russia agrees to help Trump communicate with Iran on nuclear issue. Russia has also announced that it will exert all its efforts in this regard. How do you evaluate Russia's mediation?
A: This possibility is real, considering the role that Russia has played in the adoption of the JCPOA, its closeness with Iran, and its economic interests in supporting Iran's nuclear civilian program. Just like in the case of Ukraine, Trump would certainly trust a bilateral deal with Putin more than any multilateral agreement.
Q: A recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that the agency's upcoming comprehensive report, requested by a previous resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors, is likely to align with this direction. Based on these reports—one concerning Iran's compliance with the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and the other regarding Iran's compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and the March 2023 agreement—Iran has not been in compliance in either case. Do you think the Snapback mechanism could be activated following the release of the IAEA's future reports? That is, even before the start of negotiations between Iran and the United States?
A: The Europeans have been raising this possiblity of sanctions snapback as a means of pressure in their discussions with Iran, but it is doubtful that they would actually reimpose sanctions if there is a serious perspective of a US-Russian mediation. The Europeans, who are at the origin of the JCPOA, would not want to appear tougher against Iran than Trump, who withdrew from the agreement.
Q: There is an argument that, as a result of the nature of the new world order (a system based on great power competition), the U.S. seeks to separate Russia from China or, at the very least, put Russia in a position where it no longer poses a threat to the U.S. What is your assessment of this?
A: At this stage, this is highly speculative, and Trump's foreign policy seems inspired by more short-term, pragmatic gains and goals than by a grand strategy that is not assured of success. In any case, the U.S. could also gain from the positive role played by China in the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
